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REPLY ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE DISTRICT COURT'S DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF'S
COMPLAINT BASED ON LEGISLATIVE IMMUNITY
WAS ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD BE REVERSED
1.

Legislative immunity only protects the legislative

Defendants from liability arising from actions within the legitimate legislative
sphere.
Mr. Ivie and the legislative Defendants agree that legislators
acting within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity are immune from
liability or suit. Mr. Ivie and the legislative Defendants disagree as to whether
the actions at issue as alleged in Mr. Ivie's Complaint are within the legitimate
legislative sphere.
Mr. Ivie contends that the allegations of his Complaint may be
read to place the actions alleged outside of the sphere of legitimate legislative
activity. Thus, Mr. Ivie contends the district court incorrectly ruled that the
allegations of Mr. Ivie's Complaint did not raise the possibility that the claims
asserted by Mr. Ivie against the legislative Defendants fell outside the
reasonable bounds of legislative immunity.
Legislative immunity is based primarily on the principles of
separation of powers and sovereign immunity. The framers of the federal and
1

state constitutions wanted the legislative branch to be free and independent from
other branches of government and from liability to individual citizens for the
effects of legislation affecting an entire country or state.
Mr. Ivie agrees with the legislative Defendants that the courts
have interpreted speech or debate clauses, such as that found in the Utah
Constitution at Article VI, Seclion 8, fairly broadly. (Defendants' brief at 7-14.)
For example, the courts have interpreted such clauses to provide immunity to
legislators doing all different kinds of legislative activity, regardless of whether
the legislative activity occurs on the floor of a legislative chamber or elsewhere.
Thus, the courts have applied legislative immunity to such core legislative
activities as passing legislation. Wiggins v. Stuart, 671 SW 2d 262 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1984), voting on executive appointments, Kraus v. Kentucky State Senate ,
872 SW 2d 433, 440 (Ky. 1993), confirming appointees, Consumers Educ. And
Protective Ass'n v. Nolan, 368 A.2d 675 (Pa. 1977), passing ordinances, Bogan
v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44 (1998), actions in connection with a legislative
hearing, Tennev v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 373-374 (1951), issuing a
subpoena by a Senate subcommittee, Eastland v. United States Servicemen's
Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 502 (1975), requiring an individual to testify before a
House of Representatives committee, Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168
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(1881), encouraging candid testimony during a state legislative hearing, Riddle
v. Perry, 2002 UT 10 (Utah 2000), and also to including statements in
committee minutes, Whalen v. Hanley, 63 P.3d 254, 258 (Alaska 2003), or in
committee reports, Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973). Given these
precedents, Mr. Ivie acknowledges that any action the legislative Defendants
may have taken during a speech or debate in either house or in a legislative
hearing or in a legislative investigation would be protected by legislative
immunity.
Mr. Ivie also agrees that as to any action in which legislators are
legislating policy of general application for the political entity involved (city,
county, state or nation), the motives or intentions of the legislators are not
relevant. The allegations of Mr. Ivie's Complaint concern themselves with
actions outside the sphere of legislative activity and with actions not on behalf
of the State as a whole. Mr. Ivie alleges the legislative Defendants were trying
to get him to bend the state administrative rules for one constituent.
A legislator's individual action in helping a single constituent cut
through government ,fred tape'1 by trying to influence an employee of the
executive branch to do something the law requires him to do (or to not do
something the law forbids him from doing) may possibly be viewed as a
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legislative activity,1 but trying to help one constituent by trying to coerce an
employee of the executive branch to not do something the law requires him to
do or to do something the law forbids him from doing is a different story.
Attempting to coerce an employee of the executive branch to exempt a single
constituent from the operation of State law and regulations is not. a legislative
function. It bears none of the hallmarks of traditional legislative action. The
actions alleged are not typical legislative actions. See Bogan v. Scott-Harris,
523 U.S.44, 50, 54, 118 S.Ct. 966, 970, 973, 140 L.Ed. 2d 79 (1998). Dictating
how rank and file, low level employees of the executive branch are to do their
jobs is not a field where legislators historically have had power to act. Tennev
v. Brandhove. 341 U.S. 367, 71 S.Ct. 783, 789 95 L.Ed. 2d 1019 (1951). And
that is the alleged action which is at the heart of this dispute. The policy behind
legislative immunity is to free a legislator from executive and judicial
oversight-it is not to allow a legislator to act as part of the executive branch or
as part of the judicial branch. Allowing Mr. Ivie's Complaint to proceed ahead
would not do violence to the principles behind the doctrine of legislative
immunity.

*Mr. Ivie concedes this only for sake of argument. See O'Brien v. City of Greers Ferry, 873
F.2d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir. 1994) ("Normally, a legislative act is a formulation of policy governing future
conduct for all or a class of the citizenry").
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The legislative Defendants' discussion of the principle of
legislative immunity simply begs the question-what is within the legitimate
legislative sphere; but more importantly, as regards the instant case, what is not
within the legitimate legislative sphere? If the courts use the phrase "legitimate
legislative sphere," to define the parameters of legislative immunity, then, it
stands to reason that there may be actions outside of the "legitimate legislative
sphere"-or, in other words, actions that are illegitimate or non-legislative for
which there is no legislative immunity.
The critical question is where do you draw the line between
actions within the legitimate legislative sphere and actions outside that sphere?
Ron Ivie suggests the Court draw the line at "core" legislative functions on
behalf of the governmental entity of which a legislator is a member-speech and
debate on the floor of the Legislature, voting, committee meetings, committee
investigations and so forth. Mr. Ivie agrees that the test should be the nature of
the act, not on the motive or intent of the official performing it, but on the
whether the act is fundamentally "legislative" in nature. Bogan v. Harris. 523
U.S. 44 (1998).
The test should be: does the act at issue bear some reasonable
connection to a legislative function? Eastland v. United States Servicemen's
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Fund, 421 U.S. at 503 (1975). Is the act being challenged an act reasonably
viewed as falling within the constitutional power of the legislative branch? Or,
is the act the act of a legislator acting on his own, outside the shields he has as a
member of a legislative body making legislation? See Yanero v. Davis, 65 SW
3d 510, 518 (Ky. 2001).
Mr. Ivie urges the Court to recognize such a line. He contends
that if the Court draws the line in such a way, the Court must find Mr. Ivie's
allegations as to the actions of these legislative Defendants place such actions
outside the realm of legitimate legislative activity.
2.

The alleged actions of the legislative Defendants are

outside the legitimate legislative sphere and, thus, are actionable.
As set forth above, Mr. Ivie agrees with the legislative Defendants
that the "critical question is whether the activities complained of are within the
legitimate legislative sphere." (Defendants' brief at 14.)
Where Mr. Ivie believes the district court erred (as the legislative
Defendants err in their brief in opposition) is in its description of the actions
which Mr. Ivie has alleged fall outside of the legitimate legislative sphere. Mr.
Ivie is not complaining about the budget bill the Legislature passed to cut
funding to the Bureau (which the legislative Defendants shepherded through the
6

Legislature). What Mr. Ivie is complaining about happened before any
legislative session, before any legislative investigation, before any legislative
committee meeting, before any debate on the floor and before any legislative
vote.
Senator Hickman and Representative Urquhart were supposedly
trying to help one constituent secure an exemption to the enforcement of a state
rule which did not allow any exemptions. Mr. Ivie alleges that in trying to help
one constituent, the legislative Defendants sought to coerce Mr. Ivie to not
enforce the law. And that when Mr. Ivie refused, they told him that if he did not
do what they were telling him to do, then they would deal with the matter
through other means. The legislative Defendants did have the power to deal
with the matter through legislative action changing the statute or rule. What
they did not have the right to do is make such a personal threat to an executive
branch employee. Mr. Ivie perceived this communication to him as a personal
threat because of his resistance to bending the rules. If what the legislative
Defendants meant was "we'll change the rule," Mr. Ivie would agree that any
action the legislative Defendants may have taken thereafter to change the rule
would have been within the legitimate legislative sphere. But that was not Sen.
Hickman's and Rep. Urquhart's meaning. What Sen. Hickman meant was "if
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you don't do what I am telling you to do, I'll see to it that you lose your job."
That threat falls outside of legitimate legislative authority. The legislative
Defendants can change the law and pass a budget; but they do not have the right
to fire an employee of the executive branch, directly or indirectly. Thus, the
legislative Defendants are correct when they summarize part of Mr. Ivie's claim
as claiming that the legislative Defendants "tried to interfere with Plaintiff s job
performance." (Defendants' brief at 15.) Mr. Ivie is alleging just such
interference.
In the instant case, the actions Mr. Ivie is complaining of do not
have a legislative context, these legislators were not in a legislative setting and
were not trying to make policy for the entire state; the actions alleged have a
context of a legislator acting as a manager of an executive branch agency, or
seeking to control an executive branch employee. Mr. Ivie contends that by
engaging in such interference, the legislative Defendants stepped over the line
of legislative activity into executive activity and lost their immunity.
Mr. Ivie recognizes that once the legislative Defendants went into
session, the Executive Appropriations Committee did vote to slash the funding
to the Bureau for which Mr. Ivie worked by $115,700. Although cutting the
budget had nothing to do with changing the rule on swimming pools, Mr. Ivie

8

realizes such a vote itself is legislative activity and the actions of the legislative
Defendants in voting to pass the budget bill is clearly subject to immunity.
Mr. Ivie is not only complaining about actions which occurred
before the legislative session. He is also complaining about what happened
after the legislative session. (Incidentally, before the legislative session, the
executive director of the Department of Health and the department's legal
counsel met personally with these two legislators and the constituent involved
and, in fact, stated to all three that the Department was willing to amend the
rule.) Yet, Mr. Ivie alleges that after engineering the slashing of the budget, the
legislative Defendants still coerced Mr. Ivie's superiors to implement the budget
cuts in such a way that Mr. Ivie's job was eliminated. Thus, the legislative
Defendants are correct when they summarize part of Mr. Ivie's claim as
claiming that the legislative Defendants "tried to persuade Plaintiffs boss to
terminate his employment." (Defendants' brief at 15.) Mr. Ivie is alleging just
such interference. Mr. Ivie contends that by engaging in such interference, the
legislative Defendants stepped over the line of legislative activity into executive
activity and lost their immunity.
Thus, Mr. Ivie's argument is that the district court's blanket
holding (Minute Entry, f 30, n.2 (R. at 118)) that any threats made by the

9

legislative Defendants were more or less the statements of their power as
legislators was erroneous. The legislative Defendants had the power to cut the
budget. They did not have the power to dictate how an employee of the
executive branch was to go about not enforcing the law or to force the head of
an executive branch department to implement the cuts in a manner that
improperly targeted Mr. Ivie for termination.
A legislator is not omnipotent. A legislator certainly has
legislative power, and that power may be an awesome power, but even that
power has boundaries. He (or she) can only wield legislative power, not
executive power or judicial power. A legislator cannot tell a police officer to
allow a constituent to drive over the speed limit and if the police officer refuses
to do so, engineer that employee's termination. A legislator cannot tell a judge
to dismiss a case and if the judge refuses, engineer the judge's termination.
Those would be instances of clear violations of the separation of power. If a
legislator acts outside of the legislative arena, he is outside of legislative
immunity. Mr. Ivie contends that in his situation he has alleged that the
legislative Defendants sought to exercise executive power and, thus, lost the
protection of the safe harbor of legislative immunity. The district court's
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decision to the contrary gave too broad an interpretation to legislative immunity.
POINT II. THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD NOT AFFIRM
THE DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT ON A
GROUND NOT DECIDED BY THE DISTRICT COURT.
In Point II of their brief, the legislative Defendants correctly note that the
district court based its dismissal of Mr. Ivie's complaint on the principle of legislative
immunity and did not address the legislative Defendants' alternative argument that the
legislative Defendants were not Mr. Ivie's employer under the Utah Protection of
Public Employees Act, § 67-21-1 to 9, Utah Code ("UPPEA"), and, therefore, not
subject to suit under the UPPEA. In their brief in opposition, the legislative
Defendants encourage the Court of Appeals to affirm the dismissal on this ground as
well. (Defendants'brief at 16.)
Mr. Ivie realizes that the Court may affirm a decision based on a ground
not considered by the district court but encourages the Court to resist this invitation.
The issue as to whether the legislative Defendants could be viewed as Mr. Ivie's
employer under the UPPEA is not as much a "contortion" as the legislative Defendants
suggest and, in any event, is not capable of being decided as a matter of law.
If the Court of Appeals does decide to consider the issue as to whether
the legislative Defendants could be considered Mr. Ivie's employer (or an agent of Mr.
Ivie's employer) under the UPPEA, it needs to consider the purpose of the UPPEA, the
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executive branch nature of the actions of the legislative Defendants, both before and
after the Legislative session, and perhaps even the constitutionality of the statute, if
such a statute exempts members of the State Legislature from its coverage scheme.
The legislative Defendants argue that it would be a "monumental
contortion" of agency law to conclude that Senator Hickman and Rep. Urquhart were
acting as Mr. Ivie's employer "when they took action to influence the Legislature to
reduce the Department of Health's budget." (Defendants' brief at 17-18.) Mr. Ivie
agrees; such action is not the action to which he attaches his argument that the
legislative Defendants were trying to act as his employer. Mr. Ivie's allegation (and
argument) is that before the legislative session and well before any vote, the legislative
Defendants tried to exert direct influence on the way and manner in which Mr. Ivie was
to perform his job (in the sense of trying to coerce him to exempt their constituent from
a rule he had no authority to apply in an arbitrary manner). In doing so, the legislative
Defendants were seeking to act just as an employer would act. If they were trying to
act as Mr. Ivie's employer, they ought to be able to be held to the same laws and
standards as any other state employer would be.
Likewise, Mr. Ivie's allegation (and argument) is that after the legislative
session, when the legislative Defendants sought to influence the Department of Health
to implement the budget cuts in such a way as to make sure Mr. Ivie lost his job, they
12

were seeking to act as an employer would act. Mr. Ivie contends that if a person (or
persons) seeks to act as an employer, by express authority or apparent authority or
under color of law (that is, cloaked in the authority of the executive branch), such
person or persons may and should be treated like an employer. Compare the
jurisprudence of "under color of state law" that has developed in claims under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. "It is firmly established that a defendant in a § 1983 suit acts under
color of state law when he abuses the position given to him by the state." West v.
Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988). "Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law
and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with authority of state law, is
action taken 'under color of state law.'" United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326
(1941). See also United States v. Causey. 85 F.3d 407, 415 (5 th Cir. 1999).
The legislative Defendants note that the Utah Constitution prohibits them
from acting as agents of the executive or judicial branch. (Defendants' brief, footnote
14.) But merely because the Constitution may prohibit some activity does not mean
that such activity does not occur. That is precisely Mr. Ivie's point. If, as he alleges,
the legislative Defendants tried to exercise functions appertaining to the executive
department, they are acting as his employer (or with apparent authority as an agent of
his employer) and subject to suit under UPPEA. If, as Mr. Ivie alleges, the legislative
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Defendants "walked" and "talked" like an employer, they ought to be treated as an
employer.
The legislative Defendants cannot have it both ways. The Legislature
cannot exempt itself from the UPPEA by defining employer in such a way as to apply
to only the executive branch and then seek to act as the executive branch in dictating
how the executive branch is to do its duty, with impunity.
CONCLUSION
The Court should reverse the district court's dismissal and allow the case
to be decided on the merits.
DATED this ^_ day of October, 2004.

^ J
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